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Introduction
ross-border bankrng has long been an important part

of

the trend towards

increased globalization and financial integration. Howevet, it has tecently assumed

added importance partly due to the fact that over the past decades, the banking

system has changed dramatically owing
among economies, size and speed

of

to the

advances

in technology, closer relations

financial transactions, liberalization, deregulation and

consolidation.
Cross-border banking in the form

of

direct investrnent in physical facilities is increasing

rapidly. Advances in telecommunications and computer technology permit mote efficient

operation of firms both in greatet numbers and at greater distances, as counries dismande

their regulatory and legal barriers to such banking in ordc to enhaoce the competitive
environment.

It

is argued that foreign ownership

of

banks increases competition and

efficiency in the banking sector (Eisenbeis and Kaufman,2006). Indeed, forergn entry

thtough direct investrnent is widely recommended as a means of strengthening weak and
inefficient banking structure, particula y in emerging economies. This is because banks that
are willing and able

to enter a foreign county, especially developing economies, through

direct investment are generally larger, in healthier financial condition, more professionally
managed, and more technologically advanced than the average host country banks, and may

therefore be expected to taise the bar for all banks in the host country @isenbeis and
Kaufman,2006).
Cross-border bankiog, howeveq impacts financial st2bility in two important respects. The

first is that, cross-border banking ensures that latger and more diversified banking systems
are better equipped to absorb economic shocks. The second is that, ctoss-border banking
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systemic risk across-borders, both via

ownership links and credit exposures.

In spite of the benefits derivable from cross-border banking through either branching or
subsidiaries, there are a number

of poiicy

issues that are

of concern to the regulatory

and

in an economy where financial instability has
manifested. The concerns are in the areas of provision of deposit insurance, the
effectiveness of prudential regulation, the timing of declaring an institution officially
supervisory authorities, particulady,

insolvent and placing receivership or conservatorship, and the procedure for resolvingbank
insolvencies @,isenbeis and Kaufman, 2006), among others. The recent global financial

crisis has futther underscored the need to pay more attention to cross-border banking
issues.

The provision of deposit insurance, which is one of the critical issues to consider under
cross-border banking arrangement, is

a

a

component of the financial safety-net arrangement.

Deposit insurance offers protection to depositors against baflk failures and in the process
helps boost confidence

as

well

as

promote flnancial stability in the banking system. Deposit

insurance is increasingly becoming popular as it provides a formal mechanism for dealing

with problem financial institutions. Deposit insurance also promotes financial system
stability and contributes to the smooth functioning of the payment system. The tecent
global frnancial crisis is a clear testimony to the roles being played by deposit insurance in
boosting confidence andpromoting financial system stabilityin crisis situations.

Considering the preponderance

of

cross-border banking acuviues .in recent times

particulady among the Nigerian banks, this paper critically looks at the roles the deposit
insurer could play where the banks in the country have opened subsidiaries or branches in

otler countries and where foreign banks have also opened subsidiaries in Nigeria. To
achieve that, the test of the papet is structured into four sections. Section two briefly
discusses the concepts and practices of deposit insurance, while the establishment, main
features and mandate of deposit insurance in Nigeria are highlighted in section three.
Section fout examines the link between deposit insurance and cross-botder banking, while
section five gives concluding remarks.
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II
II.1

Concepts and Practices of Deposit Insurance Scheme (DIS)
Types of DIS

imptcit deposit
insurance system and explicit deposit insurance system. The implicit type is a
There are basically two qpes of Deposit Insurance Scheme (DIS),viz, the

discretionary approach adopted by governments to prop-up failing deposit-taking financial

institutions in the absence of an explicit statutory obligation on the part of government to
protect depositors. The absence of any prior funding arrangement, lack of any formal rules
and procedures for intervention and the use

of

ad-hoc adminisuative stnrctures are some

of the features of implicit deposit insurance system (I{DIC, 1999).
An explicit DIS on the other hand is created by

a legal insttument.

The enabling satute

usually states the objectives of the scheme and other operational guidelines relating to such
issues as ownership, funding, extent

of

coverage, membership, supervisory and tesolution

por ers, amongst others. Specifically, an explicit DIS provides

a,

formoJ ftamework with

clear-cut rules and procedures for providing protection to depositors

as

well

as

for resolving

failed and failing deposit-taking institutions (lr{DIC, 1999). An explicit DIS can be designed
as either a

ll.2

risk-minimizet or zpay-box.

Worldwide Ptactices of Deposit Insutance Systems (DIS)

Explicit Deposit Insurance Systems have developed and expanded rapidly in recent years.

The main reason for the phenomenal grovth experienced in the 1980s and 1990s was

of the various financial crises that occurred in {ifferent parts of the wodd. The
introduction of explicit DIS in many jurisdictions was cleady part of the reaction to losses
arising from such financial crises and, more particularly, as part of the ddve for Enancial
because

stability nationally and intetnationally (Allen and lfood, 2006)

.

The evolution of elaborate DIS can be traced to the United States through the creation

the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)

in

of

1933, following the Great

Depression that was experienced worldwide between 1929 ar,d 1933. Throughout the
1960s, 1970s and 1980s, there were only 3, 11 and 16 deposit insurance systems in existence,

respectively,
one rype

worldwide. Hovzever, from 1980 to 1990, the number of countries that had

of explicit system ot the other had mote than doubled following the occutence of

'Tft6a*,*
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fi.nancial crises in many countries. Caprio and Klingebel (2003) documented about 117
such crises since 1980. The same factor was the principal determinant

of

of

the phenomenal

gfowth in DIS from 1990s to the 2000s. As at the end of September 2008, there were 100
countries with ooe form of expl.icit system or the other in operation, 8 pending and 11
planned or under serious study (IADI, 2008).

Apart ftom the establishment of explicit DIS in many countries, a large numbet of
countries had modiFred the existing systems by introducing significant changes. For
example, there was significant modification to the system in the USA following the failure

of

several savings and loans banks and the subsequent collapse

of

the Federal Savings and

Loans Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), which was the deposit insurer responsible for that

of the system in
Since the European Union Diective of 1994, there

sub-sector in the late eighties. In Germany, thete had been two revisions
7969 and 1998'after its establishment.

had been various tevisions to deposit insumnce practice by the member countries. Mexico

teviewed its system tvrice in 1990 and 1999, since its establishment in 1986. In Venezuela, a

review was carried out in 2001 whilst Btazil also had a revision in 2002. 7t Nigeria, a

complete ovefhaul

of the statute was done

inadequacies/weaknesses

in the system. Lately in

in .2006 following noticeable
2008, the importance of deposit

insurance further manifested when several countries either had to increase their deposit
insurance coverage levels and scope ot inroduce blanket coverage in order to restore public

confidence and prevent bank run with its attendant adverse consequences, following the
global financial crisis that shook the wotld.

The international community had also demonstrated its interest in the design

of

safety-nets

arrangement in general and deposit insurance in particular, in counffies around the world.

This is done through sponsorship of workshops, seminars, conferences and studies by the

International Monetary Fund (MF), the World Bank and the Bank for International
Setdement (BIS). Also, in recognition

of

the growing importance

financial safety-net and the increasing number

of

of

the role

of DIS in

systems around the wodd, the

International Association of Deposit Insurers (ADI), with headquarters in BIS, Basle, was

in 2002 with the ultimate objective of contributing to the enhancement of
deposit insurance effectiveness by promoting gu.idance and intetnational coopemtion.
established
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of

Through the association, an international.ly-accepted set

l7

core principles fot effective

deposit insurance systems had been developed and issued, while collaborative seminars,
workshops, conferences and sl,rnposia were organized for the benefit
as

of member countries

rvell as for the developmentof deposit insurance system woddwide.

IlL

Establishment, Features and Mandate of Deposit Insutance in Nigeria

of the nation's financial safety net, It was
through the NDIC Act 22 of 1988 (now NDIC Act 16, 2006), primarily to

Deposit insurance in Nigeria is a component
established

protect small savers by insuring the deposit liabilities of banks. It commenced operation in

March 1989. The type of deposit insurance system being practiced in Nigeria, which is

a

risk-minimizer, gives it an expanded mandate beyond the pay-box status being practiced in
other African countries such as Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. The mandate for

NDIC in Nigeria, apart from deposit guarantee, includes bank supervision

III.I

and resolution.

Design Features of DIS in Nigeria

Essentially,

the practices of deposit insutance system deal with the issues of

ownership/administration, membership, governance,

fi-di.g,

coverage and failue

resolution. Some of these featutes ate highlighted below:

III.1.1 Ownetship
Ownetship of

-

a

DIS could take any of these forms:

Joint orvnetship by the private and the public sectots;
Private ownership in which case, the scheme is solely owned by the privatc
sectot; and

It

Public ownetship where govetnment holds sole ownership.

is pertinent to note that public sector ownership

private aod joint ownerships. In Nigeria, the NDIC

the Centtal Bank
respectively.

of

of DIS
is

is given mote promioence than

wholly owned by government throl€h

Nigeria and Federal Ministry

of

Finance

in the ratio of

60:,1(t,

ll8
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IIL1.2 Membership
The issues to consider under membership include, patticipating institutions and whethet
the membership is compulsory or voluntary. Membership

of a DIS is open to deposit-

taking financial institutions usually licensed by the central bank or any other licensing
authority. However, the membership

of DIS could either

be compulsory or voluntary. The

stability of the system particu.larly during crisis is the major determinant of the nature

of

membership.

In Nigeria, membership of DIS is extended to universal banks, microfinance banks and
primary mortgage institutions licensed by the CBN to take deposits. The nature of
membership of these institutions is compulsor)'.

III.1.3 Coverage
A well-designed DIS must incorporate in its statute details telating to the covetage. The
issues

to consider under DIS coverage are maximum insurance limits and the types of

deposits covered. In terms

of amount covered, it could

be limited ot full coverage or blanket

guarantee. The blanket guarantee is usually given during banking systemic crisis, just as was

wimessed during the recent global financial crisis. As for t}re qpes

of deposits covered, all

deposits are covered apatt from some exceptions, which are usually stated in the enabling
starute.

In

some jurisdictions, foreign deposits

of

domestic banks and foreign curency

denominated local deposits are exempted from the insurance coverage on the ground that
such deposits may not affect the level

of

money supply

of

tl-re

domestic economy (I'{DIC,

1999).

In Nigeria, the maximum insurance limit is fixed atN200,000.00 per depositor per bank for
universal banks and N100,000.00 per depositor per institution for other insured financial

institutions. The NDIC Act 2006 clear\ spelt out the t,?e

of

deposits coveted by the

deposit insurance in Nigeria and the exemptions. The exemptions according to section 16

NDIC Act, 2006 include: insider deposits (that is deposits of staff and dircctors),
counter claims from person who maintains both deposit and loan accounts, the former

of

the

serving as collateml for the loan, intet-bank takings/placements and such other deposits as
may be specified from time to time bythe Board

of the Corpotation.
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III.1.4 Funding
For DIS to be effective, it must

its

have access to adequate sources

of funding to meet

obligations when they fall due. A well-designed deposit insurance system should have in
place mechanisms necessary to ensure that adequate funds are available to teimburse

in the event of an insured institution's failure and to cover the
of the system. As the experiences of several countries have shown,

depositors ptomptly
operating expenses

inadequate funding could lead to delay in resolving failed institutions as well as signilicant
increases

in costs, with attendant consequeflces on the credibility and confidence in the

system. A DIS should, therefore, be in a position to build a Deposit Inswance Fund

@IF)
that is robust enough to effectively handle crisis situations when they occur, without

for financial assistance. Such situations exclude periods of
crisis, which no DIS is designed or capable of handling only by itself without

recourse to government
systemic

government direct involvement.

The funding to a DIS could be derived from different sources, which include: initial
capitalization by owners and subsequent funding tlrrough, periodic premium contribution
by insured institutions, ex-post sutcharge, periodic rccapit tzraor, and back-up funding
arrangements. The funding through premium could either take the form

or ex-post funding or
a

a

of ex-ante funding

hybrid funding method. The ex-ante funding method is a case whete

pool of funds is accumulated and maintained in advance for use in ptompt reimbursement

of insured deposits in the eventof a failute of

an

insued depository institution. The ex-post

funding method on the other hand is a case where the funds are sourced, usually from the
participating institutions, when failures occur and the need to cover claims develops. The
case

of hybrid funding methods occurs where both the ex-ante

and ex-post methods

of

funding are used to source funds by the deposit insurer. This usually occurs when large
failures orwave

of failures

are wimessed.

The above mentioned source

s

of funds to a DIS

also apply to the

NDIC

as cleady spelt

in section 10 of NDIC Act 16,2006. However, of the sources of funds to

a

out

DIS, premium

contribution by participating institutions constitutes the most significant soutce for the
system

in Nigeria like in all jurisdictions with explicit deposit insurance

system. The

ptemium contribution by participating institutions is usually derived through the use of an
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vith

the use

of

flat-rate approach and the rate charged deposit money banks was 0.94 per cen! but later
changed to the use

of differential premium assessment system (DPAS) since 2007. With the

DPAS, the premium charged by banks has been reduced to a maximum

of

0.80 per cent.

The other financial institutions are, however, charged 0.50 per cent. The base being used for

the premium assessment is the total deposits standing in the books
institutions

as at

December ending

of

of

the insured

the preceding year, as cleady spelt out in the enabling

Act. The DIF is managed as provided for in section 13(1) of the NDIC Act 16,2006 and
based on the existing investment policy

of the Corporation. Currendy, the DIF in Nigeria is

invested in federal government securides.

III.1.5 Governance Structure
The governance structure is important as it is considered to be a critical factor for the
effectiveness

of the

system. The

NDIC

is governed by an independent governing Board.

inception and up till 1996, the Corporation had a Board
members: the Governorof the CBN

as

of Directors

made up

of

At

five

chairman, representative of the Ministry of Finance

not below the rank of a director and thtee executive members comprising the Managing

Directot and two Executive Directors. However, the structure was changed in
following an amendment to the enabling law through Decree No.

5.

1997

The Board was enlarged

from five (5) to nine (9) members. Undet that dispensation, the CBN Governor ceased to be
the Chairman

of

the Board, rather the CBN was to be represented on the Board

Corpotation by a representative not belov/ the rank
amendment provided

of

of

the

a Ditector. In addition, the

fot a part-time Chairman and three non-executive directors, in

addition to the Managing Director, two Executive Directors and a representative each from
the CBN and the Ministry

of Finance.

Following the repeal of the first enabling act and the enactment of a new Act in 2006, the
composition of the governing body was frrther enlarged from nine (9) to twelve (12). In

addition to the membership from the previous enactment, three other non-executive
directors are expected to come on board to make a total of six part-time directors. The six
part-time directors are to represent the six geo-political zones of the country. The Boatd is
appointed by the President

of Nigeria,

subject to the approval

of

the Senate (the upper

t2t
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legislative chamber)

of the Federal Republic of

Nigeria. The executive members

of

the

Board comprising the Managing Director and two Executive Directors are also appointed

of five years and renewable fot another term of five yeats and
also subject to the approval of the Senate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The
governance structute of the NDIC could pattly be explained by the growth witnessed by the
by the President for a period

system in Nigeria. It is gratifting to note that though the system in Nigeria was set-up after

that

of Kenya, it has surpassed that of Kenya

insurer in the continent.

and it is being regarded as the leading deposit

\

III.1.6 Legal Statutes BackingDIS In Nigeria
In addition to the Act establishing the Corporation, there are other statutes that provide
backing to the Corporation in the dischatge

of its mandates.

Some

of

the legislations

of Nigeria (CBITI) Act of 1991 (as amended); the Bank and Other
Financial Institutions Act (BOFIA) of 1991 (as amended); the Companies and Allied
Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990 (as amended); and the Failed Banks Act of 1994.
include the Centtal Bank

Ill.2

Mandate of the NDIC

The NDIC was established with

a

wider mandate of Deposit Guarantee, Bank Supervision

and Bank Resolution. The provision
system through prompt setdement

of deposit guarantee

of

claims in the event

is to help boost confidence in the

of

bank failure. The mandate

of

bank supervision is to ensure that necessaty ru1es, laws and gu.idelines and best practices are

complied with in the conduct of banking business in an effort to guard against excessive
risk-takingby the insured institutions,

as

well

as

preserve the integrity

of

and promote public

confidence in the banking system. The Corporation undertakes both off-site and on-site

of

of the Corporation is to
ensure that failed and failing insured institutions are resolved in a timely and efficient
manner so as to restore confidence and ensure the stability of the system. The Corpomtion
employs different tJpes of resolution mechanisms including liquidation, which is the last
supervision

insuted institutions. The bank resolution mandate

resortwhen all other measures have failed.

IV.

Role of DIS in Cross-Border Banking

The general practice is that devant laws, regulations and other provisions applicable to a
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of the bank's country of charter or

incorporation. However, the situation could change if a bank operates branches in other
counfties, or provides banking services on cross-border basis to customers in locations
abroad, either through

a

of
national borders, the implementation of

branch or a subsidiary or e-banking. Depending on the volume

setvices being rendered by the banks across

appropriately adapted policies by home and host country deposir protecdon svsrems ctn, ro
a large extent, influence cross-border banking as well as effective operation

of

deposit

Protection arrangements.

Deposit insurance as a component of safety-net arrangement is concetned with the safety

and soundness

of

insured institutions as well as the stability

of

the financial system,

especially when the insured institutions are involved in cross-border banking. The source

concern to

a

of

deposit insurerwhen insured banks are involved in cross-border banking is the

potential risk that could be transmitted actoss national borders, which is capable of
undermining depositots' interest and/or threatening the stability

of a counry's financial

in cross-border banking as with other
aspects of banking services being offered by insured institutions is basically deposit
guarantee. In addition, however, DIS with wider mandate may be involved in supervision
and bank resolution. It is, however, pertinent to note that, the nature and extent to which a
system. Therefore, the role being played by DIS

deposit insurer plays these roles depends on the policies, rules and regulation governing
banking business and deposit insutance in a country. These roles are analyzed in detail
below:

IV,1

Deposit Guatantee

Deposit insurers as national entities are qpically charged with the responsibility of
protecting domestic deposits and not foreQn deposits. However, while domestically
incorporated or chartered banks are the principal members

of most

deposit insurance

systems, some countries require foreign-bank subsidiaries and branches to participate in the

system as well. Several argunents were made for their inclusion and these include (FSF,
2001): the stability

of

the domestic financial system; the goal

of deposit insurance to all depositors;

of providing

a

minimum level

the notion that foreign banks benefit from a stable

domestic financial system and should, therefore, participate in the deposit insurance system

Donli: Cross-Border Banking in Nigeria: Any Role for Deposit Insurance Aulhorities?
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part of doing business in

a

123

country; t}le desire to minimize competitive issues by placing

foreign banks on the same footing as domestic banks; and the diversification that arises

from wider membership and expansion of the funding base. This is the pmctice in most
countries with explicit deposit insurance system except Japan, Morocco, Canada and
Macedonia, where branches of foreigrr banks are not coveted by the deposit inswance
system

of those countries.

The coverage

of

deposits

of foreign branches that only participate in the host-counry

deposit protection system is, in general, determined by the host system's regulations. That
does not rule out t}re fact that the scope and level
cogntzance the coverage provided

of

covetage may be fxed taking into

in other countties, so that, in addition to domestic

factors, external factors ate taken into account. This is the case with European banks. Also,
coverage that is comparable to that in competitots/neighbouring countries may be one
element of an ovetall stategy to strengthen the financial system and to stop the outflow

of

deposits especially in weak banking systems and banking systems that have experienced
recent crisis. This is also the case in economies that are closely linked, such

Union countries. However, it is important to avoid

a

as the

European

competitive process in which national

deposit insurance systems adapt to the ones with the most encompassing featutes and the

lowest premiums or levies without taking due cognizance
situation. Such

a

of

the country's domestic

process may have negative implications for the viability

could )eopardize financial stability. However, in some jurisdictions such

of foreigr

of

as

the scheme and

Taiwan, branches

banks covered by their home-countty deposit insurance schemes can choose

to join the host-country DIS (-Ioelscher, Taylor & Klueh, 2006)

not

.

The determination of an appropriate coverage policy could become more complex

if

the

bank's home-country system also covers deposits raised by foreign branches in foreign
jurisdictions. The coverage

of deposits at foreign btanches may be appropriate

because the

branch is a legal part of the bank and its solvency and liquidity cannot be separated ftom the
soundness

of the bank itself. In countries like Taiwan, it is only when

an overseas branch

of

a domestic. bank takes deposits in Taiwanese crrrency Q{T Dollar deposits) in other
countries that the Cental Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) will cover thet deposits
and that the same coverage as in the case

of domestic deposits will apply to the deposits in

aifii,fr#H.

124

Central Bank

ofNigeria

Economic and Financial

Reyiew

the ovetseas branch. Furthermore, domestic customers

of

Volume

47/4

December 2009

the baflk doing business with its

foreign branches might expect to be protected in the same manner as that provided when
they deal with the bank's head office.

If

the coverage

of the home-country

less encompassing than the coverage provided

system is lower

by the host-country

or

system, the

supplementary coverage could be provided by the host-countty deposit protection system.

if

of the home-countrv system of the branch is higher or
of broader scope, the branch's customers would benefit from more-encompassing
pfotection that is provided by the host-coufltry system (IADI,200|. However, the deposit
On the other hand,

the coverage

insurer should exetcise caution to avoid multiple coverage in situations where

a

branch that

already benefits from coverage by its home-country system, is obliged orgranted the right to

join the host-corlntry system. This might require appropriate provisions in contracts,
statutes and laws, and possibly mutual agrbements between the affected deposit protection

Union @L) at one time implemented what cou.ld lead to a case of
"multiple coverage" thtough one of its Deposit Insutance Ditectives in which a homesystems. The European

country deposit ptotection system could also cover deposits of
coverage in other EU jurisdicdons.
system is higher or

of brcader

If

the coverage

a

bank's branches that enjoy

of a host-country

deposits protection

scope, branches may choose supplementary coverage by this

system, provided that they accept the membership conditions

of

the host-countty system.

This practice, howeve! flo longer subsists in the EU.

Some possible consequences

.

of intensified cross-border banking could

be as follows:

Through conversion into branch-office, big deposit insurance risk-burdens might
move over from one countryinto another.

.

The difference between the coverage ievel and the scope of coverage in the same
market mightbecome competitive factors amongmembets, especially during crises.

o

A new function might

become important for the national deposit insuer

in the

future, which is, becoming the agent of forcign DIS.

In Nigeria, the deposit insurance

enabling Act is very cleat about the Corporation's

respoflsibilities to insured institutions

of

the

NDIC Act 16,2006

as

faras deposit guarantie is concerned. Section 2 (1a)

states as follows:
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'Tbe Corporation sball haue reponsibili\for:
inning all dqlsit liabilities of licerced banks and suh other deposit takinglExancial institttion:
(bereinaJter reJerred to ar "inssred institltions") operating in Nigeria n itbit tbe nmning oJ
nctians I 6 and 20 oJ tbis Act

s0 ar t0

efigerderconfdmce in tbe Nigeian

batkingysten."

From the above provision of the Act, it is clear that subsidiaries of Nigerian banks overseas
are not covered by the

branches

of

NDIC. The banking laws in Nigeria do not allow the licensing of

foreign banks in the country.

If

any foreign bank wishes to establish its

ptesence in the coufltry, it has to do so thtough a subsidiary in the country. This is to ensure

that the foreign banks are bound by all the laws, rules and regulations governing the banking
system in Nigeria.

In that regard, such subsidiaries of foreign banks that operate

incorporated in Nigeria en)oy the same DIS covemge rights

l\1.2

as

as banks

domestic banks enjoy.

Bank Resolution

The insolvency tesolution
efforts over

a

of

any company is not an event but a ptocess

of

continuing

period of time to stem the slide into Enancial bankruptry. For banks and other

financial institutions, the process will entail extensive efforts by bankers and supervisots to
restructure, revitalize and recapitalize the institutions. These crisis intervention efforts may
be undetaken undet a relatively formal statutory process, such as the prompt corective

action or under more general supervisory pou/ers.

If

the crisis intervention efforts are

of whether the bank must be placed
into a formal insolvency legal process or whether some form of supervisory forebearance
should be exercised while the insolvent institution muddles along with or without
unsuccessful, then the supervisors face the question

governrnent help. Even

resolution

of

if

a fotmal insolvency is chosen, there are many options

for the

the failed institution. The institution's assets could be liquidated or the

banking operations could be continued by government or some other insolvency authority

until a final sale or other resolution of the bank is effected. Deposit insurance agencies of
the risk-minimizer type are usually given the responsibility for bank resolution in many
jurisdictions. Different national laws apprcach insolvency issues in a number of ways
many national laws relying on variadons

of

#th

the normal company bankruptcy processes

(I+imminger,2005).
The choices among the various resolution options for responding to insolvency in financial

institutions have clear consequences that could affect the public, the government and the
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national economy at large. A well-developed insolvency system must balance the need to
avoid increasing moral hazxd in the financial system by imposing losses on creditors,
obviously starting with equity holders, who could have averted the failure while allowing for

prompt protection of smaller depositors and facilitating the continued availability of credit

in the economy. Flexibility for the insolvency authorities is crucial to strike this balance
(Gimminget,2005). The consequences of the domestic focus of most insolvency laws is
that most countries seek to exercise authority for the resolution

of a failing bank subsidiary

or branch operating within their borders under their national insolvency laws Srimminger,
2005). For subsidiaries, the host countries are the "home" country since the entities are

incorporated under their laws. As fot branches, most nations permit coopetation with

foreign insolvency authorities within consraints imposed by the national insolvency
policies, while reserving the right to conduct wholly separate insolvency proceedings to
protect creditors of the branches'local opetations.

The European Union @,t) has a slightly different arrangement as it adopted a common
apptoach to cross-border crisis management and cdsis tesolution for EU banks. The home
counffy's authorities will have primary responsibility for crisis management as the home
countty supervisor and, if appropriate, as provider of Iiquidity to the bank. Under the EU's
Ditective on the \Winding-Up of Credit Institutions of 2001, the bankruptcy laws of the

home country apply to the insolvency

of

an EU bank with branches in other member

nations. The Directive confers on the "administrative or judicial authorities

of the home

member sate" the authority to decide and implement "reorganszaoon measures" or
"winding-up (I-iquidation) proceedings".

If

the foreign bank is a non-EU institution, the

teritoriality approach q?ically used under members' national laws will be applied because
the insolvency regulation confines its scope to insolvencies within the EU (I{rimminger,
2004).

In Nigeria, the national insolvency laws prevailing are applicable to both insolvent domestic
and foreign banks that are licensed to operate in the country. The NDIC, set-up as a risk-

minimizer with broad mandate, is charged with the responsibility forbank fai.lure resolution.

If

any

of

the Nigerian Banks established a subsidiary or branch outside the country and such

oudet fail, the NDIC does not get involved in the resolution

of

such failure. However,

it
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with the supervisory authorities in the host countty to the extent of
information sharing. The NDIC uses the provisions of NDIC Act76,20O6, CAMA 1991
and BOFIA 1991 in the exercise of this responsibiliry Bank failure resolution entails
deploying corrective measures by the supervisory authorities when the condition of the
collaborates

bank has statted deteriotating. Such cottective actions include asking the shareholders to

inject additional capital, providing the bank with financial assistance to address liquidity
crisis through a bailout facility from the monetary authorities, among others. But when all

these remedial actions fail, the supervisory authorities would then take-over the
management of the bank with a view to rurning its fortunes around. It is imPortant to stress
at this iuncture that the

NDIC

has neither experienced the failure

of a subsidiary of a foreign

bank nor the failure of the bmnches/subsidiaries of its own banks in foreign countries.

IV.3

Supetvision

Just as resolution and deposit insurance laws are typically applicable to domestic financial

institutions, laws governing the supervision

of

banks are also applicable to nationally

chartered or incorporated institutions. However, due to increased involvement

of

banks in

cross-border banking, the need to extend supervision beyond the national botders, to cover
subsidiaries and branches

of the home

banks overseas becomes mote compelling. Such

supervision arises when looking at the bank on a consolidated basis. Thete is the genetal
belief that activities undertaken by subsidiaries or branches in host countries could affect the
balance sheets

of

tl're parent banks

in home countries. This means that crisis being suffered

by a subsidiary ot a branch in a host country,

if not immediately

checked and depending on

the exposue to the parent bank, could negatively affect the financial health of the parent
bank. There is, therefote, the need for supervisors in both the home and the host countries

to collaborate, particulatly through effective information sharing so as to ensure t}re
attainment of common obiective of maintaining stability in their respective financial
systems.

It is in tealization of this

objective that the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

@CBS) was created. The committee is expected to develop guidance on supervision for use

by supervisors and in the ptocess address the questions

of information

sharing between

home and host supervisors across the globe, which was particulady done under the new
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Capital Framework. The committee promoted supervisory cooperation through the
issuance

of

successive principles governing cross-botder supervision since 1975. Such

principles include: principles for the supervision of banks'foreign establishments (1983),

minimum standards for the supervision of international banking groups and their crossbotder establishments (1992) and the supervision of cross-border banking (1996). A key
feature

of this framework

is that internatioflal banking groups need to be supervised on

consolidated basis, covering all aspects

2006). Consolidated supervision

of

of

a

the business, domestic and cross-border (BCBS,

an international banking group requires effective

coopetation and information sharing between home supervisors and host supervisors
(BCBS,2006).

In Nigeria, the extent of involvement of the deposit insuter in cross-border supervision is
to the extent allowed by the Nigerian banking laws. The supervisory powers of the NDIC
are

limited to the insuted financial institutions chartered in Nigeria and duly licensed by the

CBN. This therefore means that subsidiaries or branches whose parent banks were
chartered in Nigeria would not come under the supervisory purview
because they are under the supervisory purview

of

of

the

NDIC. This is

the supervisory authorities in their

countries of operation. Howeveq based on the platform established by the BCBS, which
requires that banking group should be supervised on a consolidated basis, the
examine the books

of

NDIC may

the bank through its consolidated financiai statement and effective

information sharing so as to have a clearer picture of the ovetall health status of the parent

of maximum benefit from the cross-border infotmation
'West
the Corporation attends meetings of Committee of Bank Supervisots of

bank. To ensure the rca\za,tton
sharing,

African Countries, set-up to enhance information sharing amongst supervisors within the
ECOWAS member states. !7ith regards to the branches and subsidiaries of Nigerian banks
outside the ECOITAS, there is the fleed for the NDIC to establish an uflderstanding

it and the

in those countries, which should not be limited to only
information sharing but also on-site examination where necessary, so as to enhance the
between

effectiveness

supervisors

of its supervisory capabilities.
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Concluding Remarks

From the above discussions, it is clear that cross-border banking has become increasingly
popular amongst banks around the world, owing to globalization and integration of national
economies. It

is,

however,largely governed by national laws. It is

a.lso clear that

cross-border

banking has the potentials for transmitting systemic risk across borders, both via ownership

links and credit exposures. That is why, it has in recent times, more than afly other time,
attracted the attention

of supervisory authorities

as well as deposit insurance authorities.

The concerns of the supervisory and deposit insurance authorities are related to, among
others, deposit insurance, effectiveness

of

of prudential regulation and supervision, the timing

declaring an institution officially insolvent and placing receivership or conservatorship,

and the procedure for resolving bank insolvencies. To the extent that cross-botdet banking
is largelvgoverned by national laws and there is no

intetnational law developed and accepted

by all countries, thete is the need for gteatet teliance on effective

information sharing among

supervisors in different coufltries. This would facilitate the development
banking

as

well

as ensure the

of cross-border

stability of individual country's and global financial system.
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